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KERRY INVESTMENT COMPANY: IS TRACING TAXING?
Donald G. Meath
In June of 1972 the Tax Court of the United States applied section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code' and its implementing regulations2
by allocating to the parent gross income earned by a wholly owned
subsidiary through the use of interest-free loans made by its parent.'
The tax court imposed a new tracing concept requiring the petitioner
to show that interest-free loans did not produce gross income, and held
that the Commissioner has the power under section 482 to allocate
gross income to the parent where the proceeds of interest-free loans
produced gross income or could not be traced into non-income producing
assets.
4
The Petitioner, Kerry Investment Company is a Washington cor-
poration. It is a closely held personal holding company with assets
consisting of stocks, bond, debentures, notes and contracts receivable.
Kerry Timber Company5 is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kerry Invest-
ment. Kerry Investment loaned funds, interest-free, to Timber over a
period of years between 1948 and 1966. The loans totalled $505,617.50
at the end of the issue years 1966 and 1967, and were represented by a
non-interest bearing contract with a deferred balance of $120,000 ;6 non-
interest demand notes totalling $326,617.50; and a non-interest bearing
open account in the amount of $59,000. Timber used the proceeds of the
loans to make various investments, meet current business obligations,
and make advancements to tenants. Timber received gross income dur-
ing the issue years and on its tax return claimed no deduction for
interest on the loans made by Kerry Investment. 7 Kerry Investment
1INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §482. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers.
Taxpayers.
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secre-
tary or his delegates may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if
he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organi-
zations, trades, or businesses.
sTreas. Reg. 1.482-1 (1961); Treas. Reg. 482-2 (1968).
OKerry Investment Company, 58 T.C. 479 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Kerry
Investment].
'Id. at 490.
5Hereinafter referred to as Timber.
'The Medical Arts Building Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kerry Investment
until its voluntary dissolution in 1948, sold certain real estate to Timber and the con-
tract of sale was subsequently transferred to Kerry Investment when the Medical
Arts Building Company was liquidated. The sale contract provided that the deferred
balance was not to bear interest.
"Timber did claim deductions for interest paid on loans from the Washington Mutual
Savings Bank.
1
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did not receive or accrue any interest income from the loans, or make
any contention that the loans were, in reality, a contribution to capital.'
The tax court agreed with the Commissioner's action under section
482 holding that where money is loaned on an interest-free basis be-
tween related entities,9 and the borrower realizes gross income from the
use of such loans, the Commissioner has the power, under section 482,
to allocate a portion of the borrower's gross income to the lender to the
extent that the lender cannot trace the proceeds of the loans into non-
income producing properties.10 It was determined that an amount equal
to five per cent of the total loans which the petitioner could not trace
into non-income producing properties was a reasonable allocation of
Timber's gross income to "reflect an arm's length interest rate for the
use of such loan or advance."" However, it was clearly pointed out
that the Commissioner was without authority to make any adjustment
under section 482 with respect to funds which did not produce gross
income during the issue years.
12
Section 482 is couched in broad and comprehensive terms giving
the Commissioner remedial and discretionary authority to act in order
to prevent evasion or clearly reflect income between controlled entities.
The earliest predecessor of section 482 was section 240(d) of the
Revenue Act of 192113 which authorized the Commissioner to con-
solidate the accounts of related trades and businesses for the purpose
of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of their income.
The Revenue Act of 192814 expanded the Commissioner's right to "con-
solidate" accounts to a right to "distribute, apportion or allocate gross
income or deductions." Since the Revenue Act of 1928 the language of
the current section 482 and its other predecessors 5 has remained sub-
stantially the same. The legislative intent has remained basically the
same since 1921.16 The intent of Congress has been to allow the Com-
missioner to:
8A possible defense might have been that the loans were contributions to the capital
of Timber and thus excluded from gross income. This defense was not used.
7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION, §38.22 (1967).
OCommon control is a prerequisite for a §482 allocation.
'0The court held that placing the burden on the taxpayer was in accord with the general
concept of the burden of proof in tax cases and would encourage good record-keeping.
Kerry Investment, supra note 3 at 489, 490.
LId. at 486. Although the five per cent allocation of gross income is technically in-
distinquishable from an allocation of interest income the reasonableness of five per
cent was not challenged.
1id. at 490.
13REVENUE ACT OF 1921, ch. 136, §240(d), 42 Stat. 227.
1
'REvEwuB ACT OF 1928, ch. 852, §45, 45 Stat. 791.
lZREVENUE ACT OF 1934, ch. 277, §45, 48 Stat. 680; INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §45, 54
Stat. 725.
1Spaeth, Section 482-Past and Future, 47 TAXES 45, 46 (1969).
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... distribute the income or deductions between or among (com-
monly controlled taxpayers) ..., as may be necessary in order to pre-
vent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales,
and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milking'),
and in order to clearly reflect their true tax liability.'
Although the code and its legislative history are uncluttered and rela-
tively simple the case precedents have not allowed such a pattern.
In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. CommissionerIs the petitioner
rented river equipment to a wholly owned subsidiary, Mississippi Sand
and Gravel Co. Pursuant to an oral agreement, a previously agreed
rental of $1,000 a month was not charged during the issue year. Under
the authority of section 45 of the Revenue Act of 193419 the Commis-
sioner assessed $12,000 of rental income20 to the petitioner. Although
the Board of Tax Appeals21 sustained the Commissioner's action the
sixth circuit reversed, holding that the Commissioner made no attempt
to allocate any portion of the subsidiary's gross income. The circuit
court held that the Commissioner had simply charged the petitioner
with rental income and that section 45 "did not authorize the Commis-
sioner to set up income where none existed. '22 In Smith-Bridgman &
Co.,23 the petitioner, a wholly owned subsidiary, made non-interest bear-
ing loans to its parent in order that the parent could retire certain
outstanding debentures. The Commissioner used the authority of section
45 of the Internal Revenue Code of 193924 to increase the petitioner's
net income by adding $5,865.50 in interest income. The tax court held
that the Commissioner had created income out of a transaction where
no income was realized:
That the respondent did not 'allocate' gross income of Continental
is apparent, since the record shows no adjustment to the income or
deductions of Continental.'
The Commissioner initially acquiesced in the Smith-Bridgman holding.2 6
However, this acquiescence was later explained on the basis of concur-
rence in the result only, a result which the Commissioner believed to be
due to his procedural failure to make correlative adjustments in gross
income of the parent.27
17H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928).
"Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940) [here-
inafter referred to as Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel].
"REVENUE ACT OF 1934, ch. 277, §45, 48 Stat. 680.
9'The statutory notice of deficiency purported to assess rental income instead of allo-
cating a portion of the borrower's gross income.
"Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel, 7P-H BTA Mem. 416 (1938).
'Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel, supra note 18 at 510.
2Smith-Bridgman & Company, 16 T.C. 287 (1951) [hereinafter referred to as Smith-
Bridgman & Co.].
2'INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §45, 53 Stat. 725.
"Smith-Bridgman & Co., supra note 23 at 294.
91951-1 Cum. BULL. 3.
27Rev. Rul. 67-79; 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 117.
At least some commentators were in agreement with the Commissioner's explanation.
Plumb and Kapp, 41 TAXES 809, 815 (1963).
B. BITTKER - J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPn.ATTnq ANn WA_
-
HOLDERS (1971).
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In 1968 the Treasury Department promulgated new regulations
under section 482. The new regulations were intended to redefine and
delineate the implementation and application of section 482 to certain
specific transactions (e.g., interest-free loans) between controlled tax-
payers.28 The purpose of the new regulations was to place a controlled
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, and the standard
to be applied was that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. 29 The first case involving
interest-free loans decided under the new regulations was PPG Industries,
Inc.30 PPG made interest-free loans to its wholly owned Brazilian sub-
sidiary (Pittsburco) in 1940. In 1960 the Commissioner attempted to
allocate a portion of Pittsburco's gross income to PPG. The tax court,
without deciding the validity of the regulation under section 482 or
deciding whether the Commissioner was authorized to make an allocation
of income which is "indistinguishable from the imputation of an interest
charge," held that not even the "most tenuous connection" existed be-
tween the 1940 loans and the 1960 gross income of Pittsburco.3 ' The
tax court simply could not believe that the 1940 interest-free advances
were the transaction out of which the 1960 gross income was realized
and thus held that section 482 was inapplicable. It was indicated that
the Commissioner's procedural failure to make correlative adjustments
in Smith-Bridgman would not be a sufficiently controlling factor to dis-
tinguish Smith-Bridgman.32
A few days after the decision in PPG Industries the tax court
decided Huber Homes, Inc.a3  Huber Homes, the petitioner, transferred
52 homes to a subsidiary at cost. The homes were rented by the sub-
sidiary, and although a loss was sustained on the rental, the Commissioner
determined that income should be allocated to the petitioner to the
extent of the excess of fair market value of the homes over the sales
price to the subsidiary. The Commissioner's determination was held to
be unauthorized under section 482:
[T]he Commissioner does not here contend that any of Huber Invest-
ment's gross rental income was not earned by it or that any portion
of its income should be allocated to Huber Homes. Rather the
Commissioner is purporting to exercise his authority under section
482 to create income ... 
F,
Without passing on the validity of the regulations at issue the Court
held that the regulations were inapplicable in a situation where there
28Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(a) (1968) (Loans or advances); Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(b) (1968)
(Performance of services for another); Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(e) (1968) (Use of tangible
property); Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(d) (1968) (Transfer or use of intangible property);
Tress. Reg. 1.482-2(e) (1968) (Sales of tangible property).
TTreas. Reg. 1.482-1(b) (1) (1961).
PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970).11d. at 1009.
aId.
0Huber Homes, Inc., 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
"id. at 607.
[Vol. 34
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was no intention to resell,8 5 where the houses were converted for rental
purposes and where they did not appear to be productive of any net
income whatever.
The trend of these cases was disappointing from the Commissioner's
viewpoint until the decision of the second circuit in B. Foreman Company
v. Commissioner.36 The tax court had held that the requisite control
necessary for an application of section 482 was not present and thus
did not decide the question of whether the Commissioner was authorized
to make an allocation of income.37 The circuit court reversed the tax
court on the issue of control and then went on to hold, as valid, both
the regulations and the Commissioner's allocation of five per cent interest
income to the petitioner as a result of interest-free loans made by the
petitioner to a related entity. It is not entirely clear from the decision
whether the borrower had gross income.38 However, it is clear that an
allocation indistinguishable from an imputation of interest charges was
held to be authorized. B. Foreman thus became a definite departure
from the position of the tax court in the precedent cases.
The previously discussed cases formed the underpinning of the
Kerry Investment decision. Smith-Bridgman and Tennessee-Arkansas
Gravel were distinguished on the ground that there was gross income and
that it was evidenced by correlative adjustments in the borrower's in-
come.8 9 PPG Industries was distinguished on the basis that there was
a definite tie between the interest-free loans and Timber's gross income
in the year in question.40 Huber Homes was distinguished:
The court also stated at 610, [referring to Huber Homes decision]
perhaps in anticipation of a case like the present one:
"But if as a consequence of ... use or consumption by the transferee(of goods or services transferred to it at less than arm's length
prices), income is realized within the controlled group, an entirely
different question would be presented .... "u
Although the Commissioner purported to allocate interest income in
the statutory notice of deficiency the court held that the notice could
have been more "artfully worded" but that the petitioner was sufficiently
put on notice of the deficiency. 42 Accordingly, the Commissioner was not
bound by the exact wording of the statutory notice of deficiency. The
'The validity of a distinction between the intention to resell a bargain-purchase and
the intention to rent the proceeds of a bargain has been questioned.
Broder, Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, The Creation, Allocation and Inpu.
tation of Incone: Vital Distinctions, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 91, 96 (Fall 1971).
"B. Foreman Company v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter
referred to as B. Foreman Co.].
-'54 T.C. 912, 923 (1970).
8The court in Kerry Investment noted that the borrower apparently did have gross
income during the year in question. Kerry Investment, supra note 3 at 490.
$Old. at 491.
'Old.
aId.
"id. at 493.
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overall decision was grounded on reasoning that drew an analogy be-
tween a bargain sale at less than arm's length and a non-interest loan
at less than arm's length. The court reasoned that if one related party
sells to another related party at a bargain and then the bargain buyer
resells, a portion of the gross income earned by the sale was really made
by the original bargain seller.
Similarly, when a related party makes an interest-free loan, it has
done all that is necessary to realize interest income, except charge
interest: and some of the gross income which the borrower realizes
from the use of the proceeds of the loan has, in reality, been earned
by funds of the lender.'
Judge Irwin and Judge Forrester were careful to point out, in a con-
curring opinion, that the tax court was reaffirming its position in dis-
allowing the Commissioner to make section 482 allocations where his
only allegation is that interest-free advances were made between related
parties, however, the income generatd by the use and consumption (court's
emphasis) of interest-free loans could be allocated. 44
The analogy treating an interest-free loan similarly to a bargain
sale, and court reasoning based on this analogy (ultimately imposing a
tracing concept), suffers from a dramatic analogical point of difference.
Money is fungible, money has inherent usable worth, and all money
looks alike. Consequently, when interest-free loans are advanced and
gross income is realized by the borrower the very nature of money
indicates that some portion of the borrower's gross income has been
earned through the use and consumption of the interest-free funds. In a
bargain sale situation the goods must be resold for there to be any
income generated-by the use of the bargain sale. But in the interest-free
loan situation the proceeds of such loans could be traced directly into
non-income producing properties and yet the borrower's gross income
would inevitably reflect the use or consumption of the interest-free loans
through the use of other funds which were freed for use by virtue of the
interest-free advances. B. Foreman made this recognition in conjunction
with a plain reading of Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(a) (1). 4 - The Kerry Invest-
ment court, although not bound by the decision in B. Foreman, failed to
sufficiently distinguish the B. Foreman decision and the application of
the regulations in that case.4 6 Kerry Investment affirmed the approval
of the regulations in B. Foreman, but went on to impose a tracing con-
'Id. at 485.
"Id. at 494.
"Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(a) (1) (1968) (Loans or advances)
(1) In general. Where one member of a group of controlled entities makes a loan
or advance directly or indirectly to, or otherwise becomes a creditor of, another member
of such group, and charges no interest, or charges interest at a rate that is not equal
to an arm's length rate as defined in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the dis-
trict director may make appropriate allocations to reflect an arm's length interest
rate for the use of such loan or advance.
-In a companion case, The Kahler Corporation, 58 T.C. 496 (1972), the court stated
that it was of the opinion that the Second Circuit incorrectly delineated both the pur-
pose of section 482 and the circumstances required before the statute could operate in
the B. Foreman decision.
[Vol. 34
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cept not required by Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(a). The failure to satisfactorily
distinguish B. Foreman along with the adoption of a tracing concept
"inconsistent with the language of section 482 and its implementing
regulations. . ." led Judge Featherston to dissent, calling the tracing
concept a "mischievous rule" that places a "premium on accounting so-
phistication and 'lays a trap for the unwary'. '47
CONCLUSION
The tracing concept is new although hints of its forthcoming could
be found between the lines of PPG Industries and Hluber Homes.48 How-
ever, no prior decisions have specifically placed the burden on the peti-
tioner to trace interest-free loans into non-income producing assets in
order to escape a section 482 allocation. Despite a certain equitable
appeal, the decision cannot easily be reconciled with B. Foreman or the
plain meaning of Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(a). However, B. Foreman appears
to be a major departure from any precedent and is not declaratory of
the tax court's affirmed position on the "creation of income. '49 There
are now three different positions with respect to the treatment of
interest-free loans between related entities under section 482. It is
too early to ascertain the impact of the Kerry Investment decision, al-
though if the case is appealed and the ninth circuit sustains the position
of the tax court, a declaration of the application of section 482 to
interest-free loans by the Supreme Court of the United States may be
in order. Until such time, any corporation contemplating interest-free
loans to a subsidiary that is subject to a different tax rate may want to
consider interest-free loans that are specifically invested in non-income
producing properties.
'7Kerry Investment, supra note 3 at 495.
"The PPG Industries court found that not even the "most tenuous tie" existed between
the 1940 loans and the 1960 gross income and the Huber Homes, Inc. court thought
that a different situation would exist if the proceeds of the bargain sale were used
or consumed thereby producing gross income within the controlled group. PPG Indus-
tries. Inc. supra note 30 at 1009: Huber Homes, Inc.. supra note 33 at 610.
"
9 Kerry Investment, supra note 3 at 490; The Kahler Corp., supra note 46 at 508.
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